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WHEN THE WAR ON POVERTY BECAME THE WAR ON
POOR, PREGNANT WOMEN: POLITICAL RHETORIC, THE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE, AND THE
FAMILY CAP RESTRICTION
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to
the female sex evidently unfit it for many of the occupations of
civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which is
founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of
things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly
belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood.'
In the 1870s, this was the public conception of women's ability
to work in the public sphere - the wage-earning world. Bradwell v.
Illinois highlights the expectations of women at the time: stay home
and take care of the "family organization [and] ... domestic
sphere .... 2 Women were expected to be primary caregivers for the
elderly and young, and not to earn wages in the public economic
forum. Even a highly educated woman could be denied the right to
work, as the following demonstrates:
The harmony, not to say identity, of interests and views which
belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant
to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent
career from that of her husband.... It is true that many women
are unmarried and not affected by any of the duties, com-
plications, and incapacities arising out of the married state, but
these are exceptions to the general rule. The paramount destiny
and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices
of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. And the
rules of civil society must be adapted to the general constitution
of things, and cannot be based upon exceptional cases.'
In Bradwell, the plaintiff was denied the right to practice law
because she was a woman.4 As the above quotations demonstrate,
it was thought improper for a married woman to work when she
ought to be taking care of the home and children instead.5 While
this may once have been true, expectations of women have changed
drastically over the years.
1. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 141-42.
4. Id. at 140.
5. See id. at 141-42.
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This change in expectations of women is apparent in the history
and evolution of federal assistance programs.6 These assistance
programs are influenced by conflicting visions of the proper role of
women. Current streams of political thought alternate between the
1870 view of women staying at home taking care of children ("family
values"), v and a more modern view of women as coequals of men,
also in the working world earning money ("welfare-to-work").'
Current federal law, in theory, allows women to hold nearly any
job.9 Furthermore, no longer are unmarried women unaffected by
the duties, complications, and incapacities the Court in Bradwell
suggested arose out of the married state. ° Many women who are
unmarried have children, and many married women do not have
children. The traditional view of married women with children is
unraveling. This change both contributes to, and strikes against,
the myth of the welfare queen; that is, the idea that women on
welfare act like a Queen Bee, lounging at home and doing nothing
more than procreating while waiting for everything to be delivered
6. See generally CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 1950 -
1980 (1984) (discussing and evaluating many different federal assistance programs
throughout American history).
7. There are many who argue the "family values" theory is based on a sexist view of
males as the wage-earner in the family, and promotes the traditional married family structure
when it may be inappropriate. See MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, UNDER ATTACK, FIGHTING BACK;
WOMEN AND WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (2000); see also Katha Pollitt, Did someone
say 'Hypocrites'?, THE NATION, Apr. 13, 1998, at 9 ("[The Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act] begins with a hymn to marriage and is based on the theory
that poverty and social dysfunction are based on the untrammeled sexuality of poor women.").
Others have argued there were many moral issues in the creation of assistance for single
mothers and their children, and these continue to persist. "In spite of the apparent success
of the early ADC legislation, relief for single mothers and their children has always been
highly controversial. At issue were such societal values as the patriarchal family, the
domestic code, and the perceived responsibility of men to support their families." JOEL F.
HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM 92 (1995).
The hypocrisy and internal contradictions inherent in this "family values" rhetoric is
clarified by Mimi Abramovitz: "[tioday's call for a return to 'family values' is part of an effort
to restore the family ethic and its gender division of labor by stigmatizing nontraditional
family and by pushing women (except welfare mothers) to return to their 'rightful' place in
the home." ABRAMOVITZ, supra at 91.
8. Gary Burtless, The Employment Experiences and Potential Earnings of Welfare
Recipients, in WELFARE REFORM, 1996-2000: IS THERE A SAFETY NET?. 51 (C. John E. Hansan
& Robert Morris eds., 1999) ("In particular, each state must now ensure that a rising
percentage of its adult aid recipients is engaged in approved work. The head of each family
on welfare is required to work within two years after assistance payments begin."); see also
David M. Kennedy, California Welfare Reform, in ETHICSAND POLITICS 266-79 (Amy Gutmann
& Dennis Thompson eds., 1997) (discussing the different views towards "workfare" options
in California in the early 1980s).
9. See 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a) (1994) (prohibiting employment discrimination "based on
sex").
10. See Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141-42.
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to her by the worker bees. 1 In a less metaphorical description, it
has also been defined as a myth based on the image of "the lazy
mother on welfare who breeds children at the expense of the tax-
payer in order to increase the amount of her welfare check.""
The second view, women as coequal wage earners, tends to
influence welfare policy more than the view of women as the
caretaker. The woman as caretaker role is reserved only for women
who have sources of income that allow them to stay home, generally
their husband's income. The common opinion of women on welfare,
furthered by many political leaders, is they ought to work rather
than collect assistance services, and they should not be allowed to
have more children if they cannot support them financially. 3 No
longer should women with children avoid working, but exactly the
opposite: these women should be forced to work outside the home
without regard to their desire to do so.
Welfare has historically been a women's issue. At its inception,
the federal government wanted to provide for single women with
children who, presumably, could not provide for themselves econ-
omically. "In subsidizing the family and women's unpaid labor in
the home, the state helped families. But it also reinforced both the
family ethic and the work ethic, and thus perpetuated the economic
dependence of women on men." 4 In fact, the vast majority of people
currently receiving public assistance benefits are women. "Poverty
itself is very much a women's issue, and so is welfare. Most adults
who receive welfare are mothers of young children." 5 Because of
this, the impact of new welfare programs on women, the majority of
the recipients, is very important. Societal expectations of women
11. For a thorough discussion of the definition of the "welfare queen" see infra notes 45-53
and accompanying text. See also Risa Kaufman, The Cultural Meaning of the "Welfare
Queen": Using State Constitutions to Challenge Child Exclusion Provisions, 23 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 301, 313 (1997) (discussing the welfare queen myth at great length,
including the origin of the term and current conception of it); Catherine R. Albiston & Laura
Beth Nielsen, Welfare Queens and Other Fairy Tales: Welfare Reform and Unconstitutional
Reproductive Controls, 38 How. L.J. 473, 474 (1995) (describing many of the inaccurate
assumptions and stereotypes of welfare recipients used in Welfare Reform rhetoric).
12. Dorothy Roberts, Exploding the Myths Behind New Jersey Welfare Reform, N.J. L.J.,
Jan. 25, 1993, at 21.
13. See generally Linda C. McClain, "Irresponsible" Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339
(1996) (describing typical public opinion of women having children while receiving public
assistance). Even with all of the literature explaining welfare recipients are not lazy and
greedy, there is still ambiguity as to what they do with their time. For an excellent
examination of this topic, see DAVID ZUCCHINO, MYTH OF THE WELFARE QUEEN (1997).
14. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 7, at 97.
15. Nat'l Organization for Women Legal Defense and Education Fund (NOW LDEF),
Economic Justice for All Women, available at http://www.nowldef.org/html/issues/wel/index
.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2001).
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have profoundly affected the different elements of the current, and
indeed even former, programs. 6
While welfare programs in the United States originally aimed
to provide for widows (and their children) so that they did not have
to work outside the home, 7 this has changed. 8 The former pro-
gram, Aid to Families with Dependent Children 9 (AFDC) was a
joint federal and state program established under Title VI-A of the
Social Security Act.2° Under the current system, Temporary Assis-
tance for Needy Families2 (TANF), women not only are expected to
work outside the home in wage earning positions, but they also are
expected not to have families at all. Specifically, women are
expected not to increase the size of these families after they start
receiving public assistance. Twenty-three state governments dis-
courage women from having children under the current family cap
laws in place.22 While women in these states may still receive in-
16. For an analysis of how single mothers in general are portrayed in, and affected by,
current welfare laws, see Parvin Huda, Singled Out: A Critique of the Representation of Single
Motherhood in Welfare Discourse, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 341, 343-50 (2001).
17. MURRAY, supra note 6, at 18 ("The New Deal sponsors of AFDC had intended to help
the widow with small children. The support she received would tide her over in the interim
between the loss of her husband and the day when the children were old enough to take over
her support."); see also REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, CONTRACT WITH AMERICA; THE
BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY, AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO
CHANGE THE NATION 65 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994) [hereinafter REPUBLICAN
NATIONAL COMMITTEE] ("Established in 1935 under the Social Security Act, AFDC was
created to help widows care for their children."); Lucy Williams, The Ideology of Division:
Behavior Modification Welfare Reform Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719, 723 (1992) ("Aid to
Dependent Children (ADC), assisted the children of women who were white, widowed, and
had been connected to men for a substantial portion of their lives.");
18. The current trend in federally sponsored assistance programs began in 1988 with the
passage of the Family Support Act. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 7, at 25 ("The FSA [Family
Support Act] transformed AFDC from a program to help single mothers stay home with their
children into a mandatory work program."). This transformation continued with the Welfare
Reform activism of 1996. See MARTHA R. BURT ET. AL., THE SOCIAL SAFETY NET AT THE
BEGINNING OF FEDERAL WELFARE REFORM: ORGANIZATION OF AND ACCESS TO SOCIAL SERVICES
FOR LOW-INCOME FAMILIES 2 (Urban Inst. Press, Occasional Paper No. 34, 2000) ("In August
1996, Congress fundamentally changed the nature of that safety net for families with children
when it passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996.").
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-687 (1988).
20. C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991, 997 (D.N.J. 1995) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1988)).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1988).
22. L. JEROME GALLAGHER, MEGAN GALLAGHER, KEVIN PERESE, SUSAN SCHREIBER, KEITH
WATSON, ONE YEAR AFTER FEDERAL WELFARE REFORM: A DESCRIPTION OF STATE TEMPORARY
ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF) AS OF OCTOBER 1997 41 (Urban Inst. Press,
Occasional Paper No. 6, J.998). These states include: Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Wisconsin. For a description of the
individual states' programs, see id. at 36-43. A 2001 GAO report listed slightly different
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kind benefits, such as vouchers for diapers, or food stamps, these
women forfeit cash assistance when they have more children after
they begin receiving public assistance.2 3 "The cap would prevent
welfare mothers from getting another $50 to $60 a month, on
average, if they have another child while on welfare, but they would
get additional Medicaid and Food Stamp benefits."24
The government's goal of preventing low-income, assistance-
receiving women, from having children is carried out through the
family cap, or child exclusions program. While the specific pro-
grams vary from state to state, they all generally prevent the
increase in benefits that traditionally accompanied an increase in
family size. These programs effectively prevent children born to a
woman, after she has begun to receive assistance, from receiving the
same benefits their older siblings receive. While states are not
required to enact family cap legislation under TANF, such a require-
ment was considered during the debates regarding passage of
TANF.25 In the final TANF legislation, the concept of the family cap
was inserted as an option that states may choose to implement.26
Under the previous assistance program (AFDC), if a state wanted
to enact such a limit, the federal government had to grant it a
waiver.2 Interestingly, there was a strange coalition of anti-
states adding Wyoming and leaving New Hampshire off the list. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO-01-924, WELFARE REFORM; MORE RESEARCH NEEDED ON TANF FAMILY
CAPS AND OTHER POLICIES FOR REDUCING OUT-OF-WEDLOCK BIRTHS 15 (2001).
For a more partisan evaluation of the family cap legislation, see NOW LDEF,
Reproductive Rights, available at http://www.nowldef.org/html/issues/wel/advrepro.htm (last
visited Apr. 30, 2001); NOW LDEF, Reproductive Rights and Welfare: Update on Recent Child
Exclusion Developments, available at http://www.nowldef.org/html/issues/wel/chexdv.htm (last
visited Apr. 30, 2001).
Incidentally, the terminology used in this sort of legislation is highly politically
motivated. For instance, the NOW LDEF tends to use the phrase "child exclusion" to
emphasize the fact that the benefits being denied to these women are supposed to provide for
their children. See id. More conservative sources use phrases such as "paying unwed mothers
to have more children on welfare" instead. Howard Kurtz, 30-Second Politics, WASH. POST,
Jan. 23, 1996, at A6 (quoting Phil Gramm, a noted conservative politician). Phrases like these
emphasize a flawed economic interpretation of what was occurring under AFDC programs.
23. ACLU Will Appeal Welfare "Family Cap," THE RECORD (Bergen, N.J.), Dec. 17, 1999,
at All ("Medicaid and food stamps are provided for the new baby....").
24. GARY BRYNER, POLITICS AND PUBLIC MORTALITY 200 (1998).
25. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 7, at 37.
26. Id.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (1988). See generally C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991, 997
(D.N.J. 1995) (describing the waiver situation which New Jersey found itself in 1995);
HANDLER, supra note 7, at 89-99 (detailing the history of waiver requirements and the
applications for waivers from AFDC requirements). In fact, there were many other program
alternatives for which states were required to obtain waivers. The most popular of these
restrictions on welfare benefits were: work requirements, school attendance, family planning
mandates, immunization requirements, and immigration restrictions. See id. at 98.
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abortion, feminist, and pro-choice groups lobbying to prevent the
passage of any requirement for family cap limits in TANF.28 This
coalition of unlikely teammates has so far been unable to convince
any court that this family cap should not be allowed. This Note
suggests why this finding by the courts has been wrong, and ways
in which to convince courts to prevent the family cap restrictions
from being enforced.
The first part of this Note examines the common (mis)con-
ception of welfare recipients, defines the stereotype of the "welfare
queen," and considers how this leads to support for family cap laws.
The second part examines current welfare law and how the welfare
reform activities in 1996 changed this. The third part considers the
individual right to procreate and applies it to a recent case in New
Jersey, suggesting a different theory upon which the case could have
been brought. The conclusion of this Note suggests a need for
further litigation in this area.
STEREOTYPES OF THE WELFARE RECIPIENT
Society is full of misconceptions, and the idea of the "typical"
welfare recipient is just as flawed as any other negative societal
stereotype. For instance:
It]he statistics might show that whites have always been the
largest single group of AFDC recipients, but the stereotype that
.enraged the critics was the family of four, five, six and more
children reared at government expense, and somehow stories
about such families always seemed to talk about black families.29
Politicians and the public at large have been reluctant to accept
what the statistics show, and instead believe the stereotypes and
the horror stories. This is a dangerous premise from which to make
laws. As one legal writer commented:
28. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 7, at 37; see also BRYNER, supra note 24, at 262 (noting that
in Illinois anti-abortion and abortion rights groups joined in criticizing the family cap);
BRYNER, supra note 24, at 109 (noting "representatives of the United States Catholic bishops,
Catholic Charities, and Feminists for Life joined the National Right to Life Committee"
speaking out against certain welfare reform proposals).
29. MURRAY, supra note 6, at 18. See also McClain, supra note 13, at 379 ("For example,
many critics of welfare rhetoric observe that the stereotypical image of the welfare recipient
is a black, unmarried woman. Although white women in fact constitute a slightly greater
percentage of all AFDC recipients, 'no one has a clear image of who or where these [white]
recipients are" (quoting Andrew Hacker, The Crackdown on African-Americans, THE NATION,
July 10, 1995, at 45-46.)).
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[T]he current rhetoric of irresponsible reproduction cannot serve
as an adequate basis for serious public debate about reproduc-
tion and responsibility or for changing law and public policy. Its
models are flawed, reflect a problematic gender ideology and
troublesome stereotypes about people in poverty, and rely upon
reductive accounts of human motivation in the area of reproduc-
tive behavior."
To a large extent, politicians and activist groups use the horror
stories and stereotypes because they draw attention and motivate
public outcry.3' Far from conveying the true profile of a welfare
recipient, these practices tend to distort the truth. Negative stereo-
types abound and public opinion reflects those stereotypes. "[T]he
welfare recipient as victim gives way to the welfare recipient as
culpable exploiter of the system: the images of the able-bodied idler,
the welfare queen, the deadbeat dad, or the food stamp cheater all
suggest evasion of responsibility by imposing costs upon, or shifting
them to, others."32 Whether this is accurate, true, or a matter of
opinion, it is the image that motivates the public to support the
political leaders' misguided initiatives.
Deserving Poor vs. Undeserving Poor
Historically, stereotypes and myths of the poor have informed
the creation, shape and scope of public assistance programs.
Specifically, myths which differentiate the "undeserving" poor
from the "deserving" poorjustify punitive welfare policies on the
basis that certain populations (unwed mothers "lazy" and
shiftless paupers) are responsible for their poverty and must be
discouraged and prevented from depending upon public assis-
tance.33
There has always been a difference in public opinion and legislative
actions between the deserving and undeserving poor.34 This differ-
ence was created commonly to answer the question "[w]ho should -
and.. .who should not - receive help?"35 An easy distinction was,
30. McClain, supra note 13, at 342.
31. DEBORAH A. STONE, POLICY PARADOX; THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING 146-47
(1997).
32. McClain, supra note 13, at 376-77.
33. Kaufman, supra note 11, at 308.
34. See, eg., MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR; FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO
THE WAR ON WELFARE 9-16 (1989). The author would like to thank Mr. Katz for inspiring the
title of this Note.
35. Id. at 9.
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and still is, race. When welfare programs were first created in the
United States, many people felt white widows deserved assistance,
while for black widows they "s[aw] no reason why the employable
Negro mother should not continue her usually sketchy seasonal
labor or indefinite domestic service rather than receive a public
assistance check."
36
During welfare reform's first transformation in the early 1980s,
the difference in the public conception of deserving and undeserving
poor was evident in public commentary. "The concept of the social
safety net entered the public policy arena during the early 1980s, as
changes initiated by the Reagan administration sought to stream-
line government programs while maintaining supports for people
termed 'the truly needy.'" 37 Of course, the people deciding who fit
into this category had motivations beyond just providing for the
welfare state.
The "Welfare Queen".
"[T]he average citizen considers all AFDC recipients as part of
the 'underclass,' i.e., African-American, long-term welfare recipients
who live in inner-city ghettos and regularly have babies."" The
common vision of the "welfare mother" is a woman receiving public
assistance for many years, who does not work, does not want to
work, and has children irresponsibly.39 While public opinion - and
indeed, legislative action-may reflect this belief, the facts simply
do not reflect this impression.4" For instance, studies have shown
that families receiving government assistance are smaller than
families in the general population.4 The average family size for the
entire population of the United States was 3.18 in 1995,42 while the
36. Williams, supra note 17, at 724 (quoting Winifred Bell, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN
9-13 (1965)).
37. BURT ET AL., supra note 18 (citing MARTHA BURT & KAREN J. PITTMAN, TESTING THE
SOCIAL SAFETY NET (Urban Inst. Press, 1985)).
38. Williams, supra note 17, at 742.
39. See McClain, supra note 13, at 345 ("In contrast 'irresponsible' reproduction takes
place...where parents are not self-sufficient but instead, encouraged by the incentive of
welfare benefits, shift the financial costs of parenting to others (e.g., the taxpayer-supported
welfare state)."). See generally Kaufman, supra note 11 (discussing the stereotype at great
length).
40. See generally NOW LDEF, 1999-00 Background on Child Exclusion Proposals, III.
Problems with Child Exclusion Programs, available at http://www.nowldef.org/html/issues/
wel/childep.shtml (last visited Apr. 30, 2001) (detailing various misconceptions about child
exclusion programs) [hereinafter NOW LDEF, Background on Child Exclusion Proposals].
41. See id.
42. See Table 1: Families by Type, Age, Metropolitan-Nonmetropolitan Residence, and Race
and Hispanic Origin of Householder, March 1998, at http://www.census.gov.html (last visited
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average family size for AFDC recipients was 2.8.' The notion that
women receiving federal assistance have children in order to receive
more assistance is another misconception that is flatly untrue."
WELFARE REFORM AND A REVIEW OF CURRENT WELFARE LAW
Historical Significance of Welfare Programs
There has been a paradigm shift in the purpose of public
assistance in recent years. As mentioned in the introduction of this
Note, the original goals of public assistance were to provide for
single-parent (generally female-led) families.45 In the original
AFDC legislation, Congress stated it authorized familial financial
aid:
for the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent children in
their own homes or in the homes of relatives by enabling each
State to furnish financial assistance and rehabilitation and other
services, as far as practicable under the conditions in such State,
to needy dependent children and the parents or relatives with
whom they are living to help maintain and strengthen family life
and to help such parents or relatives to attain or retain capabil-
ity for the maximum self-support and personal independence
consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental care and
protection.... 46
As late as 1974, United States Federal Courts were still citing this
need to provide for single parent families as the reason for federal
welfare programs.47
May 1, 2001).
43. BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 105TH CONG., TABLE 7-24, at 454 (2d Sess. 1998).
44. See NOW LDEF, Background on Child Exclusion Proposals, supra note 40; see also
Kaufman, supra note 11, at 311 (citing William Julius Wilson & Kathryn M. Neckerman,
Poverty and Family Structure, in FIGHTING POVERTY: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T 248-51
(Sheldon H. Danziger & Daniel Weinberg eds., 1986) (citing studies indicating no association
between the receipt of welfare benefits and out of wedlock births)).
45. See supra notes 29-44 and accompanying text.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1988) (cited in C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Sup. 991, 998 (D.N.J. 1995));
see also MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE; A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE
IN AMERICA 306 (rev. ed. 1996) ("When Aid to Dependent Children originated in 1935,
relatively few married women worked for wages, its sponsors intended to help widows with
children remain at home.").
47. See, e.g., Doe v. Gillman, 479 F.2d 646,648 (8th Cir. 1974) ("The AFDC provisions of
the Social Security Act envision aid to strengthen the entire family unit, including the
dependent child's parent, so as to encourage the care of the child within his [or her] home.").
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President Kennedy was much more idealistic in his character-
ization of the goals for public welfare programs:
The goals of our public welfare program must be positive and
constructive.... [The welfare program] must stress the integrity
and preservation of the family unit. It must contribute to the
attack on dependency, juvenile delinquency, family breakdown,
illegitimacy, ill health, and disability. It must reduce the
incidence of these problems, prevent their occurrence and
recurrence, and strengthen and protect the vulnerable in a
highly competitive world.'
President Kennedy is considered to be the first President to conceive
such a role for the American federal government in any situation.49
Not all actors in the United States government shared'President
Kennedy's idealism, but it is a poignant example of an alternative
point of view.
Whatever the original goals and accomplishments of AFDC
were, they all changed drastically in 1996, when "Congress funda-
mentally changed the nature of that safety net for families with
children when it passed the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996."5o The Personal Responsi-
bility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, ("PRWORA")
changed AFDC to TANF and effected a drastic change in the way in
which federal welfare programs are administered. 1 It also demon-
strated a paradigm shift in the government's attitude towards
assistance programs.52 Beginning in the early 1980s, some govern-
mental actors characterized welfare as a social evil engendering
economic.and moral degradation: "Welfare became the centerpiece
of an explanation for economic stagnation and moral decay. As a
48. MURRAY, supra note 6, at 15 (quoting President John F. Kennedy's welfare message
to Congress in 1962).
49. Id.
50. BURT ET AL., supra note 18, at 2. These reforms did not create legislation with
identical goals of the original AFDC program in the Social Security Act. Rather, they took
place during a paradigmatic shift of public opinion of government sponsored welfare
programs. "Earlier themes in welfare reform or antipoverty policy appeared liberal anachron-
isms inappropriate to the new obsession with dependence, embodied mainly in young
unmarried mothers and their 'illegitimate' children. Welfare reform focused more on
changing behavior than helping people survive with some comfort and dignity." KATZ, supra
note 34, at 301.
51. BURT ET AL., supra note 18, at 2.
52. KATZ, supra note 34, at 301 ("Welfare reform focused more on changing behavior than
helping people survive with some comfort and dignity.").
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causal theory this conservative criticism was largely wrong, but it
was nonetheless plausible and coherent."53
Family Cap in Welfare Reform
"Child exclusion provisions seek to 'promote individual responsi-
bility' and 'strengthen and stabilize the family unit' by discouraging
welfare recipients from having additional children. " ' Phrases such
as "promoting individual responsibility" and "strengthen and
stabilize the family unit" encourage support for these family cap
programs, even though the programs might not accomplish these
goals. Logically, it is difficult to understand how preventing poor
women from having children by denying them cash benefits will
strengthen and stabilize their families. It is clear, however, this
sort of rhetoric is closely tied with family cap policy and its growing
support throughout the nation.
"Implicit in this purpose [of promoting individual responsibility
and strengthening and stabilizing the family unit] is the assumption
that recipients, lacking a sense of responsibility and a stable family
structure, require punitive restrictions to curtail their propensity to
have numerous children for the purpose of getting welfare
benefits."55 This type of ideology reflects the idea poverty is self-
inflicted and may stem from those people above the poverty line
having difficulty understanding how those in poverty became
impoverished.56 The conclusion often reached is that poverty is the
fault of the impoverished person and such a conclusion may drive
society's response to the able-bodied unemployed.57
"In contrast to a benefit schedule tailored to children's needs,
family caps and child exclusion provisions send a 'moral message'
about responsible procreation and parenting, procreation within
marriage and with financial resources, and the limits of governmen-
tal responsibility for such procreation, thus ensuring fairness to
taxpaying working families."' Through family cap legislation the
government in effect steps in to control women who, presumably,
53. Id. at 139.
54. Kaufman, supra note 11, at 313 (quoting C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991, 1013
(D.N.J. 1995)).
55. Id.; see also McClain, supra note 13, at 396-419 (describing the theory of the proper
role of the government as interrupting immoral reproduction among welfare recipients); KATZ,
supra note 34, at 13-16 (discussing the history of the moral judgments inherent in the
distinction between poverty and pauperism).
56. HANDLER, supra note 7, at 89.
57. Id. at 91-92.
58. McClain, supra note 13, at 372.
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have no other controls on their procreative habits. The family cap
was the solution to what many people saw as a widespread problem:
lazy welfare recipients willing to live off the welfare state.
New Jersey State Welfare Reform
New Jersey applied for a waiver of the federal program to allow
a family cap provision in its state welfare program in 1992, six years
before PRWORA was enacted with its blanket allowance for state-
level experimentation. 9 At the time, the family cap "directly
conflict[ed] with existing federal law."6' President Clinton and his
administration, however, encouraged states to apply for such
waivers, and most were approved.6' Although waivers had been
available since 1988,62 few states applied for these waivers prior to
President Clinton's encouragement of the waiver program.63 Even
when state proposals conflicted with federal law, they were
approved as long as they were "'cost neutral' and include[d] 'rigorous
evaluation.'" 4 New Jersey was the first state in the country to enact
the family cap in a form as it exists today, and therefore is an ideal
state in which to examine the family cap.
SPECIFIC CASE REVIEW AND THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO PROCREATE
The Doctrine From Eisenstadt v. Baird65 Forward
The proponents of family cap legislation choose not to finan-
cially support children born to women on welfare to prevent them
59. See C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991, 997, 1000-01 (D.N.J. 1995) (discussing the
history of New Jersey's family cap legislation, part of the state's Family Development
Program ("FDP"), while considering a challenge to the FDP).
60. Id. at 1000.
61. KATZ, supra note 34, at 310-11.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (1988). Under this section of the United States Code, the state
must apply to the Department of Health and Human Services for a waiver from the federal
program requirements. Id.
63. KATZ, supra note 34, at 310.
64. Id. at 311 (citing Robert Pear, Dole Reversal; A Welfare Revolution Hits Home, But
Quietly, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1995, at § 4, 1). While these waivers were granted without
extensive analysis regarding their constitutionality, many of the programs have been
incorporated into TANF or remain at the state level. For an example of a program that
granted a waiver and then subsequently found it unconstitutional, see Green v. Anderson, 811
F. Supp. 516 (E.D. Cal. 1993), affd, 26 F.3d 95 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding a program that cut
benefits to new residents an unconstitutional violation of the right to travel). For a pre-
reform analysis of the efficacy of waivers, as well as the proliferation of them, see HANDLER,
supra note 7, at 89-99. Some of the most unique state level programs are analyzed by
Handler as well. See id. at 99-109.
65. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
2002] WAR ON POVERTY
from having more children. The flawed reasoning behind this
movement is women, and indeed most families, do not have children
because they know they have the money to do so. "Most people do
not view having a baby as the prize for having made it economi-
cally.. .66 In fact, even taxpaying women do not "...have a child to
gain an additional tax deduction for a dependent."67 The use of
flawed economic reasoning to withhold a constitutional right, that
to bear children, is a dangerous action in which the government
engages.68
At this program's inception, many experts did not believe
women would stop having children just because they ceased to
receive more cash benefits for them.69 In fact, the monetary incen-
tive to women receiving public assistance to have more children is
more mythological than real:
66. Williams, supra note 17, at 739.
67. Id. •
68. For a discussion of why this is troubling, see infra notes 100-11 and accompanying
text.
69. Interestingly enough, although research has shown that welfare benefits will not
induce a woman to have children, see supra note 48 and accompanying text, the opposite is
true in that the restriction of the benefits will prevent a woman from having children. See
Suzanne Fields, Smaller Families on Welfare, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis, TN), Nov.
7, 1998, at A6 (citing study by Rutgers University showing that New Jersey, the first state
to institute a family cap of any sort, reduced births to welfare mothers by just over 14,000);
Cheryl Wetzstein, Welfare Policy Gets Credit for Reduction in Births; 'Family Cap' Leads to
Rise in Abortions, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1998, at Al; NOW LDEF, What Congress Didn't Tell
You: A State-by-State Guide to the Welfare Law's Hidden Reproductive Rights Agenda,
Introduction and Overview of Reproductive Rights and TANF, available at http://www.nowldef
.org/html/courts/economic.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2001).
The Rutgers University multivariate regression analysis used the probit (more or less
likely) method and controlled for the race, age, education level, marital status, monthly
eafnings, and length of time on AFDC of the mother, as well as the number of AFDC available
children in the family. This is a common method of trend analysis that allows statistics to
isolate the effect of each different variable controlled for, as well as the key examination
variable. It showed the number of children expected to be born to New Jersey AFDC
recipients, without the family cap legislation, is 14,057 more than was observed with the
family cap restriction. See Michael Camasso, Carol Harvey & Mark Killingsworth, New
Jersey's Family Cap and Family Size Decisions: Some Findings From a 5-Year Evaluation 59
(May 14, 1999) (unpublished study, on file with author) (evaluating the Family Cap Law in
New Jersey and estimating that it was responsible for "reduc[ing] births among the AFDC
population by 14,057 births").
It is interesting to note that the number of abortions welfare recipients are electing
to have has increased in New Jersey. See id. Increasing abortions was not a goal of the
supporters of Family Cap and is generally not acceptable to them. Of course, as they do not
generally provide contraception or family planning methods to these women, it is hard to
guess just how they expected family sizes would be reduced. The federal government, through
such means as the Hyde Amendment, has long avoided providing financial support for
programs that provide information on family planning or contraception. See Pub. L. No. 96-
123, 93 Stat. 923, 926 (1979).
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[T]he incremental increase that an AFDC family receives when
a new child enters the family is so small that it does not even
cover such basic essentials such as diapers, clothing, bottles and
formula. In Wisconsin, for example, an additional third child
adds $100 to the grant; in New Jersey, $64; in Mississippi, $24.
Thus if economics were really the driving factor in an AFDC
mother's decision to have a child, she would make the "rational"
decision not to do so.7
0
The monetary incentive to a taxpayer (who does not receive any
welfare assistance from the government) to have children is much
more real.7 ' Furthermore, the idea women have children to receive
welfare benefits is simply incorrect. "[S]ocial science research
indicates that receiving welfare does not motivate recipients to get
pregnant."72 This, like the idea of the "welfare queen,"73 is an
example of the flawed reasoning and common stereotypes that
further welfare policy in the United States.
Public opinion also holds that most Americans can afford to
support their children.74 The government does not only support,
however, the children of those families who cannot afford to support
them. The government assists nearly all parents by providing tax
breaks for parents with dependent children, which generally are
greater than direct benefits it confers to welfare recipients.75
"[W]hen another child is born into a 'working' family, the 'benefit'
received through a federal tax deduction is higher in actual dollars
70. Williams, supra note 17, at 740.
71. Michael Wines, Taxpayers Are Angry. They're Expensive Too., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20,
1994, § 4, at 5; see also supra note 53 and accompanying text. There are many value
judgments associated with the perceived difference between a "tax break" for a dependant
child and a welfare check for the same dependant child. Id. Frequently, the truth behind
these value judgments is not examined as closely as the size of the assistance check.
72. Kaufman, supra note 11, at 311 (citing William Julius Wilson & Kathryn M.
Neckerman, Poverty and Family Structure, in FIGHTING POVERTY: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT
DOESN'T 248-51 (Sheldon H. Danziger & Daniel Weinberg eds., 1986) (citing studies indicating
no association between the receipt of welfare benefits and out of wedlock births)).
The research by Wilson & Neckerman summarizes ten years of research using many
different statistical sampling methods and structures. See id. Despite this lack of a
connection, many politicians continued to insist that AFDC was causing women to have
children to receive benefits. "Government programs designed to give a helping hand to the
neediest of Americans have instead bred illegitimacy, crime, illiteracy, and more poverty."
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, supra note 17, at 65.
73. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
74. See McClain, supra note 13, at 357 ("[I]f the test for responsible reproduction is
reproducing without expecting to shift the costs of support to others, few families would pass
the test when one considers the many subsidies, tax benefits, and credits upon which
American families depend.").
75. The most notable and substantial of these is the deduction a taxpayer may take for
a dependant child. I.R.C. § 24 (2001).
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than the incremental amount received by an AFDC recipient in
most states."76 The general public does not recognize these benefits
to the taxpayer as a form of government assistance. Instead, these
benefits are often referred to as "tax expenditures." 7 This form of
assistance is often glossed over when public figures talk about the
government paying poor people to have children. 78 The truth is that
the government pays many people to have children.
The goal of reducing the size of welfare-receiving families is
rather misplaced. "[Tihe number of children born to an average
welfare recipient is no larger than the number born to her non-
recipient counterpart."79 Recent research has shown AFDC families
had fewer children than the national average.' This indicates
states are not trying to keep the family size of welfare recipients
"within reason," but instead are trying to keep these numbers to an
unnaturally low number, expecting them to have smaller families
than their non-recipient counterparts. 81
In Skinner v. Oklahoma,2 the Supreme Court first recognized
the right to procreate, declaring it "a sensitive and important area
of human rights."83 The Court in Skinner recognized the right of"a
person who was convicted two or more times for crime 'amounting
to felonies involving moral turpitude' to have children."' As one
commentator states, "[i]f convicted felons cannot be stripped of this
76. Williams, supra note 17, at 719 n.128.
77. See also Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155,
1157-62 (1988) (chronicling the development of the tax expenditures concept). See generally
STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985) (tracing the development
of the concept of tax expenditures).
78. See, e.g., McClain, supra note 13, at 375-76 ("People on welfare are victims of a cruel
system, caught - to use imagery from the floor debate over the Personal Responsibility Act
- in a 'trap of dependency and irresponsibility' rather than buoyed up by a 'social safety net.'"
(citing 141 CONG. REC. H3352-53 (statements of Reps. Archer, Camp and Johnson); 141 CONG.
REC. H3764 (statement of Rep. Greenwood)).
79. Kaufman, supra note 11, at 311 (citing MARK R. RANK, LIVING ON THE EDGE: THE
REALITIES OF WELFARE INAMERICA, 301 (1994)); see also supra notes 33-36 and accompanying
text.
80. See, e.g., NOW LDEF, Background on Child Exclusion Proposals, supra note 40.
81. This Note does not consider the racial impact of family cap legislation. For a
discussion of the racial implications of child exclusion policies, see generally Kaufman, supra
note 11. It is interesting to note, however, many authors have accused the American
government of engaging in a eugenics-oriented program with the recent welfare legislation.
See generally Nicole Huberfeld, Recent Development: Three Generations of Welfare Mothers Are
Enough: A Disturbing Return to Eugenics in the Recent 'Workfare' Law, 9 U.C.L.A. WOMEN'S
L.J. 98 (1998).
82. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
83. Laura M. Friedman, Family Cap and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine:
Scrutinizing a Welfare Woman's Right to Bear Children, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 637, 647 (1995)
(quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)).
84. Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)).
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right, it is difficult to condone taking it away from law-abiding
citizens simply because they are poor."'6 The government may
remove some rights, such as voting rights for convicted felons,
without violating constitutional protections,8 but may not restrict
the right to procreate. It is therefore unconscionable for the govern-
ment to do so with poor American women receiving welfare benefits.
In 1965, the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut 7 found "the
fundamental right to privacy is embedded in the penumbras of the
Bill of Rights."' This right to privacy was soon extended to various
other areas including reproduction. For instance, in 1972, the Court
in Eisenstadt v. Baird upheld the right of unmarried persons to use
contraceptive devices. 9 The Court expressly disallowed the deter-
rence of premarital sex as a constitutional legislative aim:
[T]he goals of deterring premarital sex and regulating the
distribution of potentially harmful articles cannot reasonably be
regarded as legislative aims.... And we hold that the statute,
viewed as a prohibition on contraception per se, violates the
rights of single persons under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 90
Despite this strong wording, both state governments and the federal
government continue to try to do exactly what Justice Breyer pro-
hibited by implementing child exclusion legislation.91
In 1995, a class action suit challenged the family cap in New
Jersey.92 In C.K. v. Shalala,93 the plaintiffs alleged the United
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (upholding the right of States to
disenfranchise convicted felons); Qualification of Voters, VA CONST. art. II, § 1 ("No person
who has been convicted of a felony shall be qualified to vote unless his civil rights have been
restored by the Governor of other appropriate authority."); see also WILLIAM C. KIMBERLING,
FEDERAL ELECTION LAW 96 (1996) (explaining that while there is no federal law on the topic,
the right of convicted felons to vote is a matter of state law).
87. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
88. Friedman, supra note 83, at 647.
89. 405 U.S. 438 (1972); see also Friedman, supra note 83, at 647 (quoting Justice Breyer
in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy means anything, it
is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child.")).
90. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 443.
91. Under the old AFDC system, the family cap and child exclusion was purely state
initiated; the state had to apply for a waiver to the federal government. See supra note 24 and
accompanying text. Under the newer TANF plan, however, the federal government encour-
ages these restrictions. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. Under both plans there
is a collaboration of the state and federal government when initiating a family cap.
92. See C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.J. 1995).
93. Id.
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States Secretary of Health and Human Services, Donna Shalala,
acted unconstitutionally when she approved New Jersey's family
cap waiver.s4 The plaintiffs in this case were a class of New Jersey
residents receiving welfare benefits through AFDC.95 They chal-
lenged the creation of the law on the grounds that Secretary Shalala
violated the Administrative Procedure Act96 ("APA") in accepting the
application for waiver.97 They also challenged the substance of the
law on many grounds claiming it violated:
(1) the APA since the Secretary [violated it], (2) various provi-
sions of the Social Security Act and implementing regulations,
(3) HHS [Department of Health and Human Services] regula-
tions protecting human subjects in experiments that involve
pregnant women and fetuses, and (4) the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution.9"
This case was dismissed by the court on summary judgment.9
The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine originated in the
early years of the twentieth century. 100 The Supreme Court first
recognized this doctrine in Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad
Commission of California.'' The Court held the state:
may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of
constitutional rights. If the state may compel the surrender of
one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like
manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that
guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United States
may thus be manipulated out of existence.
1 2
94. See id. at 997.
95. See id.
96. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994).
97. See Shalala, 883 F. Supp. at 997.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 1015 (holding Secretary Shalala's "action in approving New Jersey's new
welfare reform ... [was] neither arbitrary nor capricious ... [and] reflect[s] her rational
determination that the New Jersey Plan was unlikely to promote the objectives of the AFDC
program.... [Tihe Family Cap provision of the FDP does not violate any statutory or
constitutional mandate.")
100. See generally Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583 (1926)
(holding the Commission cannot require certain actions by the Frost & Frost Trucking Co.
merely because it is required to obtain a permit from the Commission).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 593-94.
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The Supreme Court expanded on this principle, bringing it into
different forums. It explained further in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island: °' "even though the government is under no obliga-
tion to provide a person, or the public, a particular benefit, it does
not follow that conferral of the benefit may be conditioned on the
surrender of a constitutional right."°4 Thus, once the government
chooses to provide a benefit, it may not force the recipient to surren-
der a constitutional right to receive it. °5
This argument can be applied easily to state-implemented
public assistance program family cap laws. First, courts do not
recognize any inherent right to welfare benefits.' °6 Second, the
family cap legislation expressly discourages women receiving
welfare benefits from having children.' 7 Considering these factors,
it is clear if "the government -is barred from indirectly violating a
right which the Constitution forbids it to violate directly," 108 then
it may not restrict the right of women receiving public assistance to
103. 571 U.S. 484 (1996).
104. Id. at 513.
105. Courts have not considered the question of whether private groups may engage in this
behavior, however. For instance, there is a private group based in California paying drug-
addicted (and likely low-income) women to obtain permanent, or semi-permanent birth
control. See Pam Belluck, Cash-for-Sterilization Plan Draws Addicts and Critics, N.Y. TIMES,
July 24, 1999, at A8 ("intended to persuade drug-addicted women to get sterilized or get long-
term birth control like Norplant or Depo-Provera. Once the women offer proof that they have
done so, they will be given $200 in cash."). This group, Children Requiring a Caring
Kommunity (C.R.A.C.K.), hosts the internet site http://www.cashforbirthcontrol.com. In the
opening letter, the organizers refute charges they are racist, and profess they are not
targeting any specific mothers, except for those who are drug addicted. See id. For a
discussion supporting this program, see generally Juli Horka-Ruiz, Note, Preventing the Birth
of Drug-Addicted Babies Through Contract: An Examination of the C.R.A.C.K. Organization,
7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 473 (2001) (describing the organization in terms of contract
rights, and advocating for its proliferation and extension to governmental actors).
106. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
107. Friedman, supra note 83, at 637 ("This program [family cap] deters families who
receive Aid to Families with Dependant Children (AFDC) benefits from having children while
on welfare by denying them additional benefits."). While Ms. Friedman was ostensibly
discussing AFDC, the family cap restrictions format has not changed substantially since then.
108. Id. at 643 ("In other words, because the government cannot enact a law forbidding
welfare mothers to have children, it cannot use a condition on their benefits to achieve the
same result.").
For an in depth analysis of the origins of the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine,
see id. at 643-46 (citing various authors discussing and developing the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, including Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory
of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1185 (1990); Richard A. Epstein, The
Supreme Court, 1987 Term - Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the
Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1988); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The
Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Why
the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (with Particular Reference to
Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593 (1990)).
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procreate. °9 In fact, Lenora Lapidus, legal director for the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of New Jersey, argued this when
talking to reporters about a recent case - Sojourner A. v. New
Jersey Department of Human Services.1 ° A newspaper article
quoted Lapidus as acknowledging "the state [is] not constitutionally
obligated to have a welfare program, but that 'once the state has
decided to give out welfare, it must do so in an even-handed way."'
111
Once a state or federal government chooses to award these public
assistance benefits, it must do so in a manner that avoids discrimi-
nation.
Applying The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine to Sojourner
A. v. New Jersey Department of Health and Human Services
The family cap legislation in New Jersey has had many vocal
opponents, including the American Civil Liberties Union, who have
challenged consistently this law in court." 2 Since its approval in
1992, the ACLU has challenged this provision repeatedly on many
different grounds. For instance, in 1997 the ACLU of New Jersey
filed the SojournerA. case, along with the National Organization for
Women Legal Defense and Education Fund (NOW LDEF) lawyers
and others, challenging the child exclusion provisions as violating
109. See Friedman, supra note 83.
110. See Randall J. Peach, Judge Uphold N.J.'s Welfare Cap Linked to Birth of Added
Children, Finds No Equal Protection Violations or Interference With Right to Procreate, N.J.
L.J., Sept. 4, 2000. Sojourner A. v. N.J. Dep't Human Servs., No. ESX-L-10171-97 (Essex
County Ct. 1997), is an unpublished decision issued by Judge Anthony Iuliani in 1997 and
described in detail in the above cited article.
111. Id. Throughout American history the courts have held there is no right to welfare,
and states may restrict access, so long as they operate within the requirements set forth in
the federal Social Security Act. See generally Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)
(holding states may invoke many restrictions, including the restriction in question of a
maximum family grant (similar to the family cap) on AFDC recipients).
112. ACLU Will Appeal Welfare 'Family Cap,' THE RECORD (Bergen County, NJ), Dec. 17,
1999, at All ("The state American Civil Liberties Union announced Thursday it is going to
court again to fight a policy that freezes cash benefits for women who have a baby while they
are on welfare."); see also Donna Leusner, ACLU Challenge New Jerseys 'Family Cap' Welfare
Law, THE STAR-LEDGER, Aug. 29, 2000 (examining how the ACLU is seeking to create a case
trom the idea that family cap requirements coerce women to have abortions, and combining
this with a quote from the state Chief Justice in a recent ruling that "the state should not
attempt to tip the scale against the right to choose an abortion absent compelling reasons to
do so").
"The New Jersey Supreme Court ... in Planned Parenthood v. Farmer said the state
may not seek to tip the scales. The state may not seek to influence, even indirectly, a
woman's decision whether to bear a child or have an abortion." Id. (quoting Lenora M.
Lapidus, legal director of ACLU of New Jersey).
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the State Constitution's equal protection and right to privacy
clauses."1
Since its inception, the NOW LDEF has opposed the many
different forms of what they term the "Child Exclusion" legisla-
tion. 14 They challenged the New Jersey Law on racial grounds as
well,1 5 asserting "the law is based on racially discriminatory
stereotypes about poor women of color, in violation of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act."116 The case was dismissed without prejudice when
there was insufficient proof of the state's intent to discriminate. 7
This Note focuses on Sojourner A. v. New Jersey Department of
Health and Human Services. The case was brought challenging the
New Jersey State Constitution." 8 Judge Iuliani, the judge in the
case, rejected the dual challenge in it "interfered with a woman's
fundamental right to decide whether to have children [and] the
argument that the law denied equal protection to children born to
families already receiving benefits.""9 Judge Iuliani explained his
reasoning, stating the law "promotes personal responsibility in
order to alter and alleviate the cycle of welfare dependency."120
Once again, the rhetoric and stereotypes concerning welfare reci-
pients influenced the decision in this case, as well as the creation of
the challenged legislation.
Particularly disturbing is evidence that Judge Iuliani does not
understand the relevance of a benefit check. His commentary
during the oral arguments demonstrates this lack of understanding.
At one point during oral arguments, Judge Iuliani commented on
the loss of the minimal cash benefits a woman having an additional
child foregoes as a result of the family cap: "[m]aybe they'll elimi-
nate buying the lottery ticket." 2' This flippant, misinformed atti-
tude is based on the "welfare queen" stereotype and similar rhetoric
surrounding the policy debate, rather than accurate statistical data.
In his decision, Judge Iuliani "acknowledged that the exclusion
might impose a 'slight burden' on a woman who decides to have
113. NOW LDEF, 1999-00 Legal Docket; Economic Justice for All Women, "Eliminating
Child Exclusion Policies,"available at http'//wwwnowldef.orglhtml/courts/economic.htm (last
visited Apr. 30, 2001) [hereinafter NOW LDEF, 1999-00 Legal Docket].
114. See generally id. (describing various cases in which the NOW LDEF represents a
party).
115. In re New Jersey Family Development Act, No. 02-92-3111 (H.H.S.).
116. NOW LDEF, 1999-00 Legal Docket supra note 113 (describing various cases in which
the NOW LDEF is involved).
117. Id.





another child, but ruled that the exclusion did not 'substantially
intrude' on a woman's reproductive rights."'22 While cash benefits
are small enough that they do not encourage women to have
children,'23 they can still provide basic subsistence for a new child.
The loss of these benefits is, in fact, substantial. Judge Iuliani
confuses the constitutionality of a law with the impact of it. A law
may be unconstitutional, even if the impact is vague or slight. It is
clear Judge Iuliani had good intentions when he mentioned, "[g]et
them educated. They deserve it. Get them trained. They deserve
it. Opportunities are abundant."124 These goals are not enough,
however. The government must not withhold cash benefits while
trying to allow those receiving benefits to get educated and trained.
Speaking on the holding of a recent case in New Jersey, New
Jersey v. Farmer,25 Ms. Lapidus argued "the court misconstrued the
standard for analyzing whether the rights to privacy and equal
protection have been infringed."126  The court in Farmer did not
appear to understand a constitutional right is violated when any
imposition occurs which can potentially cause harm to the individ-
ual seeking remedy. 127
It is estimated the family cap was responsible for 14,057 fewer
births to New Jersey welfare recipients. 2 8 When a case is brought
under a class action claim, as the Sojourner A. case should have
been, it is easy to see that Judge lIUliani's contention the law did not
have much affect is wrong. Because this law affected a large
number of female welfare recipients, Judge Iuliani's analysis is
erroneous, and the law must be reevaluated.
122. Id.
123. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
124. Peach, supra note 110.
125. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
126. Peach, supra note 110. The article quotes Ms. Lapidus as saying "The state's
obligation is to remain neutral' when it comes to -reproductive decisions.... It can't tip the
scale in either direction." Id.
127. In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), Justice Brennan summarized this principle.
If a person must chose between an individual right to practice one's own religion and receiving
unemployment benefits from the state government, it is unconstitutional coercion by the
state. Id. at 404. As such, choosing between the individual right to bear children and public
assistance benefits is also an unconstitutional restriction. See Friedman, supra note 83, at
649-50.
128. Camasso et al., supra note 69, at 59; see Appeal Likely on Welfare Cap, N.J. LAW.,
Sept. 4, 2000, at 2 ("Lenora M. Lapidus ... said plaintiffs in Sojourner A. v. New Jersey
Department of Human Services expect to appeal Essex County Superior Court Judge Anthony
J. Iuliani's decision upholding the state's 'family cap law' denying welfare payment to
recipients who bear additional children.").
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CONCLUSION
If the Sojourner A. case were brought as a class action, with
women receiving benefits as the plaintiff class, and using the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine to argue against family cap
legislation, the impact from the legislation would have been made
clear. This would have avoided the error made in Sojourner A.
when Judge Iuliani held the law did not affect many people. In the
future, cases challenging the family cap should proceed under the
federal Constitution. The doctrine of the right to bear children is
more developed under the federal Constitution than it is under state
constitutions. Using the federal Constitution's guarantee of the
right to procreate, plaintiffs can demonstrate easily the family cap
legislation clearly infringes on their right to procreate. Therefore,
it ought to be struck down. Coincidentally, under the New Jersey
Constitution, a challenge can be brought claiming the law encour-
ages abortions, and that the state government cannot enter this
realm. The family cap laws can be shown to profoundly impact
women, and the reproductive choices they make. This impact,
combined with the irrational and erroneous stereotypes the law is
based upon, present ample opportunity for future challenges.
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